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Abstract
Career concerns provide managers with implicit incentives, which benet shareholders. However, these concerns are also costly to shareholders because managers need to
be compensated for career risk. Career risk is especially signicant if a manager's
perceived ability is largely exposed to the labor market, as it is the case when the
manager is asked to implement innovative strategies. Although lowering the quality
of the information disclosed by the rm can mitigate a manager's career risk, it also
hinders the manager's eort. This study theoretically examines shareholders decisions
on innovative investments and information quality in the presence of managerial career
concerns. I show that there is a tension between mitigating the career risk resulting
from innovation and motivating managerial eort. I nd that when the innovation
urgency is intense, shareholders invest more in innovation and lower the information
quality to protect the manager from career risk. In contrast, when the level of innovation urgency is low, shareholders invest less to mitigate the manager's career risk, while
increasing the explicit incentive to motivate higher eort. My results provide possible
explanations for mixed empirical ndings on the relationship between career concerns
and investment. Moreover, my results suggest that when we examine the impact of
career concerns on investments in innovation, disclosure policy and managerial explicit
incentives, we need to consider the innovation urgency. Since innovation urgency is also
an industry-specic characteristic, my results also shed light on the aforementioned career concerns eects across industries. In addition, my results predict that experienced
CEOs may not be favored by extremely innovative or least innovative rms as much as
by middle-of-the-road innovation rms.
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Introduction

Over the past 60 years, innovation-related expenditures have been increasing dramatically,
and become a crucial strategic decision for many rms. During 1995-2007, U.S. rms' annual
innovation investments comprised 12.8% of the U.S. GDP, which is more than double the
number during the high-growth period after World War II (1948-1972) (Corrado and Hulten,
2010). March (1991) identies two forms of innovation: exploitation and exploration. Exploitation aims at improving the eciency of the current business model, while exploration
seeks to develop new business opportunities. The innovation I examine in this paper, better
characterized as exploration, includes any radical innovation that transforms the rm, such
as a broad organizational change, a strategic acquisition, entering into new markets, creating
and/or adopting new technologies, etc. Boards of directors often initiate such explorative
innovations when the competitive situation renders an intense urgency for transformation.
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As pointed out by Kotter (1995), the rst step in transforming a rm is cultivating a sense
of urgency, followed by hiring a powerful leader to steer the change (see also Helmich and
Brown, 1972). For example, after years of J.C. Penney's alarming performance, Bill Ackman,
a board member and the largest shareholder, strongly suggested that the board hire Ron
Johnson as CEO because of his remarkable success in Apple's retail operations. Indeed, a
manager's ability is a key factor in undertaking a rm transformation (Banker et al., 2013).
However, in such endeavors, the manager puts his own future career prospects at great risk.
If the innovation fails, the manager may be considered ineective, lose his job, and damage his reputation.

In the J. C. Penney example, the changes that Johnson implemented

caused a dramatic drop in the rm's revenues. He was shortly ousted and, since then, he
has not been reported to have taken an executive job. In contrast, CEOs of rms with a
clear deciency in innovation, such as GE and CISCO, are still at the helm even though
their rms have been losing prots for years (Hartung, 2012). In this sense, managers that
are asked to implement innovations bear a higher career risk than those simply adopting an
inconspicuous stewardship role. Moreover, managers' career risk needs to be appropriately
compensated. Therefore, shareholders must take into account managerial career risk when
they make decisions to innovate.
The empirical evidence regarding the relation between CEO career concerns and rm

2

investment decisions is mixed.

Some studies nd that rms' investment decreases with the

1 The innovation urgency is dierent among rms, depending on the prevailing and potential crises and
opportunities. For example, rms with recessive performances are desperate to make radical transformations
to survive (Greve, 1998); rms facing rapid market shifts should also change business practices to adapt to
the market environment; high-tech rms need to make constant innovations to maintain their reputation
and maintain a competitive advantage.

2 In previous studies, it is a common perception that the degree of career concern is negatively related
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degree of managers' career concerns. For example, Pan et al. (2013) empirically nd that
rms with CEOs in their early tenure tend to disinvest and, later on, increase investments
as the CEOs tenures extend.

In contrast, Sering (2012) nds that rms with younger

CEOs invest more than those with older CEOs, but this evidence is only signicant for highgrowth industries. This seemingly contradicting evidence suggests that deeper insight into
the interaction between managerial career concerns and innovation is needed.

Moreover,

although it may appear unrelated, career concerns also have an important inuence on
nancial statement practices. Indeed, in a survey conducted by Graham et. al., (2005) more
than three quarters of the managers admitted to have a strong incentive to meet earnings
benchmarks due to reputation concerns rather than short-term compensation. In this sense,
nancial statement practices aect manager exposure to career concerns and, therefore, must
also aect innovative investment decisions. The aforementioned evidence indicates that there
seems to be a relation between managerial career concerns and shareholders decisions on both
innovation investment and nancial information quality that deserves further examination.
In this study, I develop an analytical model to examine how shareholders jointly make
decisions on innovation and information quality in the presence of managerial career concerns.
I assume that shareholders are risk-neutral and endowed with a level of innovation urgency,
such as developing opportunities to gain a competitive advantage, resolving a current or
potential crisis, etc. Depending on the innovation urgency, shareholders decide the extent
to which changes are undertaken in the rm's business. The more the shareholders want to
change, the more they invest. Moreover, shareholders need to hire a manager to implement
such innovation.

The innovative investment outcome depends on the manager's ability

more so when the change is large. In addition, the manager is risk-averse and can improve
the outcome with a costly eort that is not publicly observable. This eort can be thought
of as an operating eort in maintaining routine business. Shareholders oer a contract to the
manager to motivate his operating eort and compensate him for career risk. In addition,
shareholders can also choose the quality of accounting information. The lower the level of
information quality, the less weight the labor market puts on the public signal when assessing
the manager's ability and, therefore, the lower the manager's career risk. However, this also
induces a noisier performance measure, thereby making motivation of the manager's eort
more dicult.

Together, the model determines the shareholders jointly optimal decisions

on innovation, information quality, and compensation contract taking into consideration the
manager's career risk.
I show that shareholders prefer imperfect information in order to protect the manager
from career risk, especially when the innovative investment is large. I nd that innovation
with CEO age and tenure.
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urgency plays a critical role in determining the way shareholders cope with career concerns.
When innovation urgency is intense, shareholders invest heavily and choose a low level of
information quality to reduce the manager's exposure to career risk. At high levels of innovation and low levels of information quality, the outcome is very volatile and, therefore,
motivating eort is very costly. However, innovation investment is inexpensive because the
manager is hardly exposed to the labor market. This yields an unexpected result: the more
concerned the manager is about his career prospects (e.g., the less is known about the manager's ability), the more shareholders invest in innovation.

In contrast, when the level of

innovation urgency is low, shareholders invest less to mitigate the manager's career risk,
and focus on motivating the manager's eort with high levels of information quality and
strong compensation incentives. At high levels of information quality, innovation investment
is costly because it exposes the manager's ability conspicuously, whereas motivating the operating eort with explicit incentives is more ecient. This produces another unexpected
result: an increase in the manager career-risk concerns induces shareholders to increase the
power of explicit compensation incentives. Indeed, higher managerial career-risk concerns
shift shareholders focus towards the operating eort even further. As a result, shareholders
reduce innovative investment, increase information quality, and increase explicit incentives.
In addition, I nd that shareholders preferences over managerial degree of career concerns
are not monotonic in the urgency of innovation. In fact, in rms with intermediate levels
of innovation urgency, managerial career concerns are most detrimental to shareholders. Indeed, in these rms, stronger career concerns result in both lower innovative investment and
managerial eort.

Therefore, these rms value an experienced manager most because his

ability is well known and, as a result, the manager is less concerned about being exposed to
the labor market. Through a numerical example in a matching model, I show that managers
with fewer career concerns, such as experienced managers, are most favored by middle-ofthe-road innovation rms.

In summary, I show that innovation urgency is critical in the

relation between managerial career concerns and shareholders decisions on innovation, disclosure policy, managerial compensation, as well as manager selection. Moreover, the impact
of innovation urgency on these relations is non-monotonic. Because innovation urgency is
also an industry-specic characteristic, my results shed light on cross-industry studies on the
impact of career concerns on rms investment and managerial compensation decisions.
My study sheds light on the mixed evidence in the literature with respect to the relationship between CEO career concerns and rm investment decisions.

The nding of a

non-monotonic relationship between career concerns and innovative investment is supported
by the empirical evidence by Sering (2012). Existing studies theoretically examining the
link between a rm's investment decision and career concerns are scattered. Holmstrom and
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Ricart i Costa (1986) show that career concerns induce a manager to underinvest in projects
with returns contingent on his ability, and the distortion in investment decisions cannot be
completely addressed with a compensation contract. Zwiebel (1995) and Prendergast and
Stole (1996) consider a setting in which the manager has private information about his ability. Zwiebel (1995) shows that if the labor market assesses managers abilities based on their
relative performance, managers may have an incentive to undertake innovative paths in order to avoid such comparison, therefore making their evaluation less accurate and less risky.
Prendergast and Stole (1996) demonstrate that in order to signal high ability, managers may
overweigh their private information in making investment decisions at the early stage but
may ultimately become too conservative. In contrast to these papers, I focus on the tradeo
shareholders face in taking decisions on innovation investment, information quality as devices
to motivate eort and mitigate the manager's career risk in a setting with no information
asymmetry about the manager's ability.
My study also contributes to the broad literature on the eect of career concerns on
managers' compensation. Holmstrom (1999) shows that career concerns may benet shareholders by providing implicit incentives that motivate managerial eort by linking managerial
performance to future wages. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue that career concerns can
actually substitute for explicit incentives in motivating managerial eort (henceforth, the
substitution eect).

However, Chen and Jiang (2006) suggest that the substitution eect

may be weakened or even reversed by considering the case in which a manager can control the
informativeness of the report about his ability. Autrey et al. (2003, 2006) examine the role
of career concerns on incentive provision considering the availability of two signals, a public
signal and a private signal. My study suggests that in addition to the direct substitution effect between career concerns and the explicit incentive, career concerns also interact with the
compensation contract indirectly through a rm's innovation. Specically, I nd that when
the level of innovation urgency is low, shareholders decrease innovation as career concerns
increase; therefore, the business becomes relatively stable and motivating managerial eort
is more ecient. As a result, my result predicts that managers' pay-performance-sensitivity
increases with career concerns if the level of innovation urgency is low.
My study is also related to the literature on the relationship between career concerns and
information quality. There is a line of literature that focuses on the role of career concerns
in motivating managerial eort in dierent information environments.

Dewatripont et al.

(1999a) compare the dierent roles of career concerns incentives within various information
structures. Arya and Mittendorf (2011), building upon Dewatripont et al. (1999a), study
a multi-agent model and compare the aggregated and disaggregated performance measures
with the existence of career concerns. There is another line of literature that implies that
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a less transparent information environment may be good for shareholders in the sense of
reducing manager career risk, which must be compensated ex-ante by the shareholders (as
seen in Hermalin and Weisbach, 2007). Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998) show that allowing
earnings manipulation will reduce the frequency of management turnover. Therefore, shareholders save ex-ante compensation for managers' dismissal risk.

In my study, I examine

the tension that shareholders face between reducing information quality to protect the manager from exposure to the labor market and improving information transparency to better
motivate managerial eort.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows:

Section 2 describes the model setup and

analyzes the labor market assessment of the manager's ability as well as the manager's
eort input strategy. Section 3 characterizes the shareholders' optimal variable choices and
examines the impact of career concerns on shareholders decisions and Section 4 concludes
the paper.

2

The model

2.1 The model setup
m (m > 0),
· i (c > 0). The

Risk-neutral shareholders are endowed with a certain level of innovation urgency
and commit to making an investment in innovation
shareholders' innovation urgency,

m,

i (>

0) at a cost 2c

and decisions on innovation,

i,

2

are public information.

The assumption that shareholders make innovative investment decisions is descriptive of
rms' transformation practices. Although managers may usually be given complete authority
for decision makings in routine operations, investments in transformations are either initiated
or at least approved by the board. The shareholders hire a risk-averse manager to lead the

a, which is unknown to all. It
that a follows a normal distribution N (0, 1/ha ). 1/ha represents the
the manager's ability. The revenue, r , is shown as:

innovation. The manager is endowed with random ability,
is common knowledge
ex-ante uncertainty of

r = i · m + i · a + e.
The revenue consists of three components. The rst component

(1)

i·m captures the comple-

mentary eects of the innovation urgency and innovative investment on the output. When
the competition is intense or the market shifts radically, the shareholders have an intense urgency to change the business practice (m is higher). In other words, innovation is protable
and the marginal benet of innovative investment is large. Shareholders therefore increase
the magnitude of innovation.

However, due to the convexity of the investment cost, the
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investment should be nite. The second term
to the revenue.

i·a

is contribution of the manager's ability

In previous studies, the sensitivity of revenue to the manager's ability is

assumed to be xed, usually normalized to 1. However this may not be descriptive on the
case in which managers are asked to undertake dierent business.

The manager's ability

3

is more crucial in transformations compared with routine business.

Therefore, I assume

the manager's ability's eect on the revenue is magnied by the innovative investment

i,

representing the fact that the manager's ability is more inuential on the revenue when he
is asked to implement innovations.
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In other words, undertaking changes will largely expose

the manager's ability. Besides the manager's ability, the manager's eort,
the rm's revenue as well.

e

e,

contributes to

could be thought of as the operating eort in maintaining the

e, is assumed to be
1
· e2 to the manager.
2
r is contractible and

status quo. As is standard in literature, the manager's choice of eort,
unobservable to the shareholders and the labor market and incurs cost
The revenue,

r,

is unobservable. However, a noisy signal

y

about

reported by the nancial reporting system:

y = r + ,
where

 ∼ N [0, h1 ],

and

h > 0.

The shareholders determine the quality of the nancial reporting system,
a contract linear in

y , w1 (y),

h,

and oer

to hire the manager. The manager will exert eort,

e,

if he

accepts the contract. The timeline is summarized in Figure 1.

0, 1, and 2. On Date 0, the shareholders
quality h (> 0), commit to invest i in innovation,

The model is a two-period model with Dates
determine the nancial reporting system's
and oer a linear contract

w1 (y)

to the manager. Following Gibbons and Murphy (1992), I

assume the contract is short term and linear in the accounting signal,

y : w1 (y) = k1 y + c1 .

The shareholders decisions are all publicly observable.
On Date

1,

the manager accepts the contract if his expected utility is no less than his

reservation utility (i.e. his ex-ante expected ability), which is normalized to

0.

The manager

3 Banker et. al. (2013) indicate that managers in R&D intensive rms are taking relatively complex
jobs, including responding to competitor's actions and environmental changes promptly, making investment
decisions, managing the R&D work force, etc. As a result, the manager's ability is more important for R&D
intensive rms compared to non-R&D intensive rms.

4 The mean of the manager's ability is normalized to zero, and as a result, ex-ante the shareholders cannot

benet from the manager's ability through innovative investment.

m

is the only source of benet for the

shareholders by investing in innovation.
I assume that in the revenue the only source of riskiness is manager ability uncertainty so that the revenue
randomness induces signicant career risk. I can introduce a systematic risk,
the revenue as

r = i · (m + η) + i · a + e.

η (η ∼ N [0, σ 2 ]),

and rewrite

The main results will quantitatively hold. However, the career risk

will be dampened because the labor market believes that the revenue is partially attributable to random
shock rather than the manager's ability.
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Figure 1: The timeline of the setup.

e > 0 at
manager w1 (y).

inputs an operating eort
shareholders pay the

a cost

1
2

· e2 .

Then the signal

y

is reported and the

On Date 2, the manager can either stay with the rm or leave and look for another
job. His new wage

w2

is determined by the labor market as the perception of the manager's

ability based on the public signal

y , namely w2 = E[a|y].5

The manager's career concerns are

introduced here. If the signal is low, the manager would be regarded as having low ability.
Therefore, in the future, the manager can only earn a low wage due to his bad reputation.
For a risk-averse manager, the volatility of future wages,

w2 ,

causes a dis-utility.

I assume the manager has an additively separable mean-variance utility function, as
shown in Eq (2).

ρ

is the manager's degree of risk aversion:

1
ρ
ρ
U (w1 , w2 , e) = E[w1 ] − V ar[w1 ] − e2 + E[w2 ] − V ar[w2 ].
2
2
2

(2)

I assume that the manager does not have access to the credit market. This utility function
follows a study by Chen and Jiang (2006), who cite empirical evidence that managers cannot
completely hedge future career risks, particularly early in their careers (Jin, 2002; Garvey and
Mibourn, 2003).

6

Many other studies assume that the principal is limited to oering a xed

contract (Arya and Mittendorf, 2011; Dewatripont et al., 1990b; Hermalin and Weisbach,
2007) such that the shareholders cannot provide the manager insurance for his future career
risk through an incentive contract.

5 To be more precise,

E[a|y]

is the manager's reservation utility on Date 2. I do not model the case in

which the manager is asked to implement innovations or exert eort on Date 2. As a result, the manager's
future wage should exactly equal his reservation utility. If there is an eort input or risk-taking on Date 2,
then the manager's future wage should compensate for the cost of eort and risk. However, the manager's
certainty equivalent of his future wage should still equal his reservation utility

E[a|y].

6 The restriction here is simply to ensure that the manager cannot insure his career risks through savings or

lendings, which raises the manager's career concerns. This assumption is stronger than necessary. Actually,
the manager's career concerns exist as long as it is not possible to completely insure the manager's future
career risk.

However, it is by assuming that insurance is totally infeasible that career concerns are most

succinctly captured.

8

2.2 The labor market's updated belief about the manager's ability
and the manager's optimal eort
I solve for the equilibrium by backward induction, starting with the labor market's perception
about the manager's ability on Date

2.

Because the nal revenue depends on both the

manager's eort and ability, to update the belief of the manager's ability, the labor market
makes a conjecture of
upon signal,

y,

e

denoted by

vary

Given

ê,

the updated belief of the manager's ability

follows a normal distribution:

a|y ∼ N [
where

ê.

1/ha · 1/h
i/ha
· (y − i · m − ê),
],
vary
vary

is the variance of the signal

y:

vary ≡ V ar[y] = i2 /ha + 1/h.
The rst term of signal

y 's

variance,

i2 /ha ,

is due to the uncertainty of the manager's

ability, and the innovation investment has a multiplicative eect here. That is, innovations
induce riskiness in the business, especially when the manager's ability is highly uncertain.
The second term of

vary , 1/h,

is the noise of the accounting signal. In previous studies, the

randomness of the signal is taken as given. However, in this model, the signal's volatility is
contingent on shareholders' endogenous choices of innovative investment, i, and information
quality,

h.

The future wages can be expressed as:

w2 (y, i, ê) = E[a|y] = k2 · (y − i · m − ê),
where

k2 =

cov(a, y)
vary

=

(3)

i/ha
.
vary

As suggested by previous studies, career concerns work as an implicit contract to the
manager: the manager has an incentive to exert eort to improve the signal thereby obtaining
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a better evaluation in the labor market.

The slope of

w 2 , k2

is referred as the career

concerns incentive. Lemma 1 captures that the career concerns incentive increases with the
information quality and the uncertainty about ability,
Lemma 1.

Proof.

1/ha .

The career concerns incentive,k2 , increases with h and 1/ha .

See Appendix.

7 In the equilibrium, the labor market's conjecture of the manager's eort is consistent with the manager's
equilibrium eort, and the labor market will accordingly undo the eect of the manager's eort on the
revenue. As a result, the manager's eort will not bias the labor market's belief about his ability. However,
the manager still has the incentive to exert eort. According to Holmstrom (1999), the manager is trapped
in supplying the equilibrium level that is expected of him, because, as in a rat race, a lower supply of labor
will bias the evaluation procedure against him.
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According to previous studies, career concerns stem from uncertainty about a manager's
ability.

The stronger the career concerns (1/ha is larger), the higher the career concerns

incentive. I show that the information quality is also critical to the career concerns incentive.
The more informative the signal

y

about the revenue, the more weight the labor market puts

on the signal to form posterior beliefs about the manager's ability. The manager's eort then
results in a stronger upward revision of the labor market perception. Therefore, the manager
is more motivated to exert eort (k2 is higher). Lemma 1 shows that the career concerns
incentive increases with the information quality, as well as with the career concerns.
After considering the labor market perception about the manager's ability, I now return
to Date 1. The manager chooses the optimal eort to maximize his expected utility, taking

w1 , and his future wages determined by the labor market,
manager solves M ax U (w1 , w2 , e).

the shareholders' explicit contract,

w2 ,

as given. Formally, the

e
From the rst-order condition of the manager's utility function, one can derive the man-

ager's optimal eort,

e∗ = k1 + k2 . This is a standard result in literature, suggesting that the

managerial eort is motivated by both the compensation incentive and the career concerns
incentive. Moreover, in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the labor market conjecture about
the manager's operating eort

ê should coincide with the manager's optimal operating eort:

ê = e∗ = k1 + k2 .

2.3 Managerial career risk
w2 , is contingent on the signal y .
ρ
Therefore, the volatility of w2 incurs a disutility to the manager, V ar[w2 ], which is referred
2
to as career risk and denoted by CR , thus,
It can be seen from Eq (3) that the manager's future wages,

ρ i2 /ha
ρ
.
CR ≡ V ar[w2 ] =
2
2ha vary
It can be easily proved that

CR

increases with

ρ

and

(4)

1
, both of which relate to the
ha

manager's personal characteristics: the risk-averse degree as well as the ex-ante uncertainty
of his ability. Therefore, for the sake of illustration, I refer to

ρ/ha

as the degree of career

concern throughout: when the manager is more risk-averse (ρ is larger) or more uncertain
about his ability (ha is smaller), the career risk is larger. CR can then be rewritten as
i2 /ha
ρ
ρ
a product of two terms,
and
, which is shown in Eq (4). The rst term,
, is
2ha
vary
2ha
i2 /ha
the manager's degree of career concerns as discussed above. The second term,
, is the
vary
proportion of the total volatility of the performance measure

y

that is attributable to the

manager's unknown ability. This could be considered as the extent to which the manager's
ability is exposed to the labor market through the accounting signal. As the manager's ability
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is increasingly exposed in the labor market, the manager bears a higher career risk. It can
be veried that
quality

h

i2 /ha
increases with the shareholders' two choice variables: the information
vary

and the innovative investment

i.

The manager's career risk, CR , increases with the information quality and the
R
R
innovative investment; i.e., ∂C
> 0, and ∂C
> 0.
∂h
∂i
Lemma 2.

Proof.

See Appendix.

Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) indicate that in a more transparent information environment, the labor market puts more weight on the random signal when forming perceptions
about the manager's ability. Thus, the manager suers from higher career risk. Besides the
information quality, a higher level of innovation makes the manager's ability has a stronger
inuence on the rm's revenue, which leads to increased exposure of the manager's ability
in the labor market, thus creating a higher career risk as well.

3

Main Results

In the previous section, I characterized the labor market determination of the manager's
future wages, the manager's optimal eort, and then captured the manager's career risk.
In this section, I return to Date 0 to examine the shareholders' optimal strategies about
the compensation contract,

i.

w1 ,

the information quality,

h,

and the innovative investment,

I next characterize the impact of career concerns on the shareholders decisions on the

innovative investment and the compensation incentive. I then examine the manager's career
concerns' impact on the shareholders' equilibrium payo and provide a numerical example
comprised of heterogeneous shareholders and managers to illustrate the endogenous matching
patterns between shareholders and managers. I nally characterize the impact of imposing
a highly-stringent disclosure policy on rms' innovation decisions.

3.1 The shareholders' optimal decisions
On Date 0, the shareholders choose the optimal decisions on the compensation contract,

w1 ,

the information quality,

payo,

πs .

h,

and the innovative investment, i, to maximize their expected

The compensation contract should satisfy the manager's participation constraint

(IR) and incentive compatible constraint (IC). The shareholders' problem is:

11

c
M ax πs (k1 , c1 , h, i) = E[r|e = e∗ ] − E[w1 (y)|e = e∗ ] − i2 ,
{k1 ,c1 ,h,i}
2
∗
s.t.
U (w1 , w2 , e ) ≥ 0, (IR),

(5)

e∗ = argM ax U (w1 , w2 , e) (IC).
e

In the following, I restrict attention to the cases with interior solutions by assuming that
parameters

ρ, ha , m, k

Condition C1:

satisfy condition C1.
√
√
2+ 2
< ρ/ha < (1 + 2)m and
2

c>

√
( 2−1)mρ
.
ha

I am able to show the shareholders' optimal choices of

k1 , c1 , h,

and

i

in the following

proposition.

In the equilibrium, the√shareholders optimally choose
2
2−1)ρha
√
the innovative investment i∗ = hha 2am−(
,
c−(3−2 2)ρ
√
√
∗
2ha+(2+ 2)ρ]
the information quality h∗ = vary∗ −i1 ∗2 /ha , where vary∗ = ih[2a +2i
∗ ρh −i∗2 ρ2 ,
a

Proposition 1.

√

√

∗2

∗2

∗2

∗2 )ρvar ∗
y

k2 −k1 +(k2 +k1
2 3 2−4 ∗
∗
∗
∗
and the contract w1∗ (y) = k1∗ y+c
1 , with k1 = 1− 2 − 2ha i ρ and c1 =
2
√
√
(2− 2) ∗
2
∗
∗
∗
k1 · i · m, where k2 = 2 − ha i ρ is the equilibrium career concerns incentive.

Proof.

See Appendix.

In the equilibrium, the IR constraint of Eq (5) is binding. As a result, according to Eq
(2), the expected payment to the manager by the shareholders,

E[w1∗ ],

can be calculated as:

ρ
1
E[w1∗ ] = V ar[w1∗ ] + e∗2 + CR∗ ,
2
2
where

CR∗ =

(6)

ρ i∗2 /ha
8
is the equilibrium career risk.
2ha vary∗

The expression of Eq (6) is similar to the equilibrium compensation payment in a standard
principal-agent model without career concerns, which covers the manager's cost of eort
and the risk from the explicit contract, with the addition of the manager's career risk. In
other words, the manager's disutility of his career risk must be compensated by the explicit
contract. Balkin et al. (2000) nd empirical evidence that for high-tech rms, CEOs' shortterm compensation is positively related to innovation.
explanation for this evidence.

My model may provide a possible

According to Lemma 2, with other things held equal, the

manager's career risk increases with innovative investment.

In other words, managers in

rms with high levels of innovative investment bear higher career risks, which must be
compensated with a higher payments from the shareholders.

8 Note that

E[w2 ]

is the ex-ante expected value of the manager's ability, which is normalized to 0.
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−

It can be seen from Proposition 1 that the shareholders' equilibrium decisions depend
on both the innovation urgency,

m,

and the manager's characteristics,

ρ

and

ha .

With the

m increases, the shareholders'
∗
optimal information quality h de-

manager's characteristics held equal, it can be veried that as
equilibrium innovative investment,

i∗ increases

while the

creases. It is intuitive that the shareholders increase the magnitude of innovative investment
as innovation becomes more protable. Larger innovation magnitude induces more exposure
of the manager's ability in the labor market and thus increases the manager's career risk for
which the shareholders must compensate. To mitigate the manager's career risk, the shareholders choose to reduce the information quality. Therefore, the shareholders' equilibrium
information quality,

h∗ ,

decreases with

m.

The above results are presented in the following

corollary.

The innovative investment that maximizes the shareholders' expected payo, i∗ ,
∂i∗
> 0. The information quality that maximizes
increases with the innovation urgency ; i.e., ∂m
∗
∗
the shareholders' expected payo, h , decreases with the innovation urgency ; i.e., ∂h
< 0.
∂m
Corollary 1.

Proof.

See Appendix.

Corollary 1 implies that rms with a higher level of innovative investment may choose
a lower level of information quality. Empirical evidence shows that the value relevance of
nancial statement has been deteriorating during the recent decades (Lev and Zarowin, 1999;
Chang, 1998; and Srivastava, 2013).

Lev and Zarowin (1999) nd that the deterioration

in the usefulness of nancial information to investors is due to changes in business scale.
Firms undergoing considerable business changes, which are measured by changes in book or
market values, have a signicant decline in the informativeness of nancial statements. They
interpret this evidence as the result of business changes generally driven by R&D investments.
R&D investments are usually believed to lower the informativeness of nancial statements
in two ways:

rst, the nancial statements cannot reect the economic consequences of

innovations (Healy and Palepu, 2001); second, the outcomes of R&D investments are highly
uncertain, resulting in high volatility in both incomes and cash ows (Srivastava, 2013).
My results may provide an alternative explanation from the career concerns point of view.
That is, when rms initiate changes in business practices by investing in innovations, their
managers are bearing future career risk. In a survey conducted by Graham et. al., (2005)
most managers agree that they have a strong incentive to meet the earnings target due to
reputation concerns rather than short-term compensation, suggesting that managers' career
concerns have an important inuence on nancial reporting practices. My result suggests
that shareholders may choose less stringent policies for preparing nancial statements, which
works to mitigate the manager's career risk. This nding provides implications for future
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empirical research on the interaction between innovative investment and disclosure policy
regarding managers' career concerns.
Shareholders decisions depend not only on the urgency of innovation, but also on the
manager's characteristics. For rms with a homogenous level of innovation urgency, shareholders' decisions may be dierent if their managers are heterogeneous regarding to career
concerns. As shown in Lemma 2, shareholders can mitigate the manager's career risk in two
ways: reducing the information quality of the accounting signal, or reducing the magnitude
of innovation.

However, both methods are costly to shareholders.

A lower level of infor-

mation quality hinders contracting with the manager, resulting in a lower level of operation
eort. Reducing the innovation magnitude directly reduces the prot of innovation, especially when there is an intense innovation urgency. The shareholders optimally determine
the level of information quality and innovative investment to maximize their expected payo,
given the manager's degree of career concerns. In the following sections, I will examine the
manager's career concerns' impact on the shareholders' choices of innovative investment and
information quality.

3.2 The manager's career concerns' eect on the shareholders' optimal innovative investment
I now analyze the eect of the manager's degree of career concern on the rm's optimal
innovative investment.
(ha
is

= ∞),

0.

In the case in which the manager's ability is perfectly observable

namely, when there are no career concerns, it is easy to see that the career risk

In other words, the shareholders do not need to compensate the manager extra for his

career risk. The shareholders will optimally choose perfect information to most eciently
motivate the manager's operating eort and choose innovative investment to maximize the
innovation prot

i(m + a) − 2c i2 .

That is, the shareholders' optimal decisions on information

quality and innovative investment are independent. For example, consider the case in which
the manager's ability,

a,

is known as

0

for certain, which is the ex-ante expected ability in

the model, then optimal innovative investment for the shareholders is

i0 = m/c.

Corollary

2 shows that in the presence of career concerns, the shareholders invest less in innovation
compared with the case in which there is no career concerns, namely

i∗ < i0 .

The shareholders underinvest in innovation in the presence of career concerns,
compared
with the case in which the manager's ability is perfectly observable as 0; i.e., i∗ =
√
2
ha m−( 2−1)ρha
√
< i0 = m/c.
h2a c−(3−2 2)ρ
Corollary 2.

Proof.

See Appendix.
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In the event that the manager is uncertain about his ability (i.e.,

ha < ∞),

the man-

ager's degree of career concern aects the shareholders' innovation decisions. The innovation
increases the variability of the revenue due to the manager's ability uncertainty and consequently induces higher volatility in the signal.

According to the standard principal-agent

model, the manager's equilibrium eort decreases as the risk unrelated to the eort increases.
Thus, the benet of motivating the manager's eort decreases with i. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in Lemma 2, the manager's career risk increases with innovative investment.
Both eects of the innovation are costly to the shareholders. As a result, due to the manager's career concerns, there is a downward distortion in the shareholders decisions on the
innovative investment.
I next analyze the relationship between the degree of career concern and the shareholders'
optimal innovative investment, represented in Proposition 2.

The shareholders' optimal innovative investment increases (decreases) as
the manager's degree of career concern becomes weaker when the level of innovation urgency
is low (high); i.e., √
√
Proposition 2.

d i∗
d ρ/ha
d i∗
d ρ/ha

Proof.

<0

if

m<

>0

if

m>

( 2−1)(ρ/ha )2 +( 2+1)c
, and
2ρ/ha √
√
2
( 2−1)(ρ/ha ) +( 2+1)c
.
2ρ/ha

See Appendix.

It is helpful to illustrate the above results through Figure 2, which shows a numerical ex-

= 2) of the relationship between the shareholders' equilibrium choice variables (i∗ ,
h∗ /ha , and k1∗ ) and the degree of career concern, hρa . Figure 2 depicts three cases contingent
on dierent expected returns of innovation (m = 1, 1.5, 2). In each cases, the X-axis is the
ample (c

manager's degree of career concerns, and the Y-axis is the shareholders' optimal choice variables, which are

i∗ , h∗ /ha , and k1∗

respectively. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between

the shareholders' optimal choice variables and the manager's degree of career concerns is
nonmonotonic, depending on the level of innovation urgency. A detailed analysis is provided
as follows.
As the manager's degree of career concern increases, the shareholders must compensate
the manager more for higher career risk. As discussed in Lemma 2, the shareholders have
two methods of mitigating the manager's career risk: lowering the innovative investment and
lowering the information quality. To examine how the shareholders use these two methods,
the equilibrium career risk can be rewritten as follows:

CR∗ =

ρ i∗2 /ha
ρ ∗ ∗
=
i · k2 .
∗
2ha vary
2ha
15

(7)

Figure 2: The shareholders' equilibrium choice variables with respect to the manager's degree
of career concern.
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From Eq (7), I derive the impact of the innovative investment on the manager's career
∗
∂ CR
= 21 hρa k2∗ . Because the manager's career risk is costly to the shareholders, the
risk,
∂ i∗
shareholders have an incentive to decrease the innovative investment when the impact of the
innovative investment on career risk increases. As the manager's degree of career concern

ρ
ha

increases, I have

√
∂ C∗
∂ C∗
∂ C∗
d ∂ i∗R
∂ ∂ i∗R
∂ ∂ i∗R ∂ k2∗
1 ∗
2− 2 ∗ ρ
=
+
= k2 + (−
i
).
d hρa
∂ hρa
∂ k2∗ ∂ hρa
2
2
ha

(8)

∂ C∗

From the rst term of Eq (8) (

∂ ∂ i∗R
∂ hρ

> 0),

we can see that an increase in the degree

a

of career concern provides a direct incentive for the shareholders to reduce

i,

because the

innovation investment results in higher career risk. However, there is an indirect incentive
(

∂

∗
∂ CR
∂ i∗
∂ k2∗

∂ k2∗
∂ hρ

< 0)

to increase

i,

which is implied by the second term of Eq (8). The reason is

a

ρ
also provides an incentive for the shareholders to reduce the informaha
∗
∗
tion quality, resulting in lower k2 . The decline in k2 dampens i's impact on CR , and provides
that the increase of

the shareholders an incentive to increase the innovative investment. The indirect incentive
is strong enough to dominate the direct incentive if the information quality dramatically
declines, such that the shareholders increase the innovative investment as a response to a
higher degree of career concern.
The indirect incentive dominates when the level of innovation urgency,
shown in the case

m = 2

in Figure 2.

m,

is large, as

In this case, innovation prot relatively outweighs

the managerial eort in the shareholders' expected payo. The shareholders invest a lot in
innovation. As career concerns become stronger, driven by either a higher risk-averse degree
or larger ability uncertainty, the benet of motivating the manager's operating eort declines.
Because the innovative investment magnies the revenue volatility that is attributable to
the manager's ability uncertainty, the decline is exacerbated by the investment.

In other

words, the increase of career concerns dampens the tradeo of reducing the information
quality, especially when the innovative investment is high.

Therefore, when the level of

innovation urgency is high, as career concerns become stronger, the shareholders largely lower
the information quality to mitigate the manager's career risk, and increase the innovative
investment to most eciently earn innovation prots.
Sering (2012) nds that rms with younger CEOs invest more than rms with older
CEOs, and the evidence only prevails with respect to high-growth industries. Conventional
wisdom interprets this as that older CEOs may be more conservative, or have the horizon
problem that they cannot benet from the long-term return of the investment.

However,

Sering (2012) documents that older CEO compensation contains fewer stock options than
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younger CEO, which implies that shareholders do not tend to encourage older CEOs to invest. My results explain this nding from the career concerns point of view. High growth
is associated with high levels of innovative investment, which induce relatively volatile revenue. There is large ability uncertainty among young managers, which magnies the revenue
volatility.

The volatility impedes motivating the manager's eort and shifts shareholders'

focus towards innovation. As a result, the shareholders will increase innovative investment
and choose a lower level of information quality to protect managers from career risk. In contrast, an older manager's ability is well known and less uncertain, therefore, the revenue is
not as volatile. Thus, the shareholders have comparably intense incentives of motivating the
manager's operating eort and obtaining innovation prot. In other words, the shareholders
will not overemphasize either the innovation or the eort. Therefore, the shareholders choose
a lower level of innovative investment and a higher level of information quality. The above
analysis suggests the underinvestment of older CEOs in a high growth rm may actually
work in the shareholders' favor.
In contrast to the case with a large

m,

when the level of innovation urgency is not

extremely large, the direct incentive dominates and the shareholders reduce the innovative
investment to mitigate the manager's career risk. Many empirical ndings suggest rms with
managers that have large career concerns invest less. For example, Pan et al. (2013) empirically nd that rms with CEOs in early tenure tend to disinvest, and increase investment
subsequently. Likewise, Barker and Mueller (2002) nd that rms with more experienced
CEOs in output functions (functions emphasize growth through discovering new products
and markets, such as marketing/sales and engineering/R&D) spend more on R&D. My result suggests that this evidence may present only in rms that are not engaged in intensive
innovations.

3.3 The manager's career concerns' eect on the shareholders' optimal explicit incentive
I next examine how the degree of career concern aects the explicit incentive

k1∗ .

The

relationship between the CEO pay-performance-sensitivities (PPS) and CEO characteristics
related to career concerns has been extensively studied.

Previous studies suggest that as

the manager's tenure increases, his ability uncertainty decreases, and his career concerns
incentive decreases. Consequently, shareholders increase the explicit incentive to motivate
the manager's eort (namely the substitution eect). In other words, for managers with a
shorter tenure or who have less experience, the career concerns incentive is relatively strong,
which lead to a lower level of explicit incentive. However, I nd the substitution eect does
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not always exist when the innovative investment decision is considered. To see this, consider
the equilibrium explicit incentive,

k1∗ ,

and career concerns incentive,

k2∗ ,

characterized in

Proposition 1:

√

k2∗
k1∗

√
2
ρ
− (2 − 2)i∗ ,
2
ha
√
√
ρ
2
= 1−
− (3 2/2 − 2)i∗ .
2
ha
=

(9)

(10)

In previous studies such as Gibbons and Murphy (1992), the career concerns incentive,

k2 ,

depends only on the manager's characteristics represented by

ρ

and

ha .

However, in my

model, the shareholders are able to set the information quality and innovative investment in
response to the manager's career concerns, both of which aect the career concerns incentive.
In other words, the shareholders are able to determine the career concerns incentive through
the information quality and set the explicit incentive through the contract. Because both
incentives are contingent on the same performance measure,

y,

they should response to

the manager's career concerns in the same direction to optimize the shareholders' expected
payo, which is in contrast to the dierent movement directions of the explicit incentive and
career concerns incentive with respect to career concerns as suggested in previous studies.
As a result, the substitution eect may not always hold, especially when the innovation
urgency is small.

In this case, the shareholders invest little in innovation and focus on

motivating the manager's eort by choosing a high level of information quality.

Due to

the low innovative investment, the rm's business is relatively safe and the revenue is less
volatile. Motivating the manager's eort is then ecient, hence the benet of motivating
the manager's eort is large. On the other hand, due to the high level of information quality,
the labor market pays particular attention to the accounting signal when evaluating the
manager's ability.

As a result, reducing the innovative investment, thereby reducing the

volatility of the accounting signal, is an ecient way to mitigate the career risk. Therefore,
as the degree of career concerns increases, the shareholders' focus shifts further toward
motivating the operating eort. The shareholders will increase the compensation incentive
and mitigate the manager's career risk by dramatically reducing the innovative investment
(as shown in the case of

m = 1 in Figure 2).

The above results are summarized in Proposition

4.

In the equilibrium, the shareholders' optimal explicit incentive increases
(decreases) as the manager's degree of career concern becomes weaker when the level of innovation urgency is low (high); i.e.,

Proposition 3.
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d k1∗
dρ/ha
d k1∗
dρ/ha

Proof.

<0

if

m>

>0

if

m<

√
(6−4 2)cρ/ha
√
√
, and
2
(5 2−7)(ρ/h
√ a ) +( 2−1)c
(6−4 2)cρ/ha
√
√
.
(5 2−7)(ρ/ha )2 +( 2−1)c

See Appendix.

Proposition 3 identies the link between CEO PPS with career concerns through innovative investment. It suggests that career concerns impact PPS non-monotonically depending
on the expected level of innovation urgency

m.

For rms with low levels of innovation urgency

such as monopoly rms, the above results predict a positive relationship between managers'
career concerns and PPS. The prediction stems from the fact that as the manager's degree
of career concern diminishes, the shareholders invest more in innovation, resulting in volatile
revenues.

Therefore, the shareholders choose to reduce PPS because it is less ecient in

motivating the manager's eort.

However, for rms with larger R&D spending such as,

high-tech rms, the above results predict a negative relationship between the manager's career concerns and PPS. The reason is that as the manager's career concerns get weaker, the
eciency of motivating the manager's eort largely improves and the shareholders consequently increase the PPS. Because the level of innovation urgency varies among industries,
Proposition 3 suggests that we should examine the link between managers' career concerns
and PPS in cross-industry studies.

3.4 The eect of career concerns on the shareholders payo
So far, I have analyzed the shareholders' optimal choice variables and the manager's optimal
eort inputting strategy. In the equilibrium, the shareholders' expected payo is calculated
as:

πs∗ (m,

√
c + m[m − 2( 2 − 1)ρ/ha ]
ρ
√
)=
.
ha
2[c − (3 − 2 2)(ρ/ha )2 ]

(11)

With all other things held equal, a higher degree of career concern leads to higher career
risk for the manager, which should be compensated by the shareholders.

Furthermore, a

higher degree of career concern reduces the manager's incentive to exert eort, which also
negatively aects the shareholders. Thus, the shareholders' expected payo decreases with
the degree of the manager's career concerns.

Throughout this study, I assume that there

is only one rm and managers are identical in their degree of career concerns. However, in
reality, managers are heterogeneous in their career concerns while the innovation urgency
varies among rms. For instance, more experienced managers, whose ability is well known
and have less uncertainty than rookie managers could be considered to have a lower degree of
career concern. Because the shareholders are better o with managers having a lower degree
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of career concern, the shareholders may compete to hire experienced managers. Competition
increases experienced managers' compensation. Finally, experienced managers will be hired
by the shareholders who most value them most.

N rms
and N managers. The number of the players are not crucial. For example, I assume N = 11.
Firm j is endowed with a level of innovation urgency, mj while manager k is endowed with
k
a degree of career concerns, dk ≡ ρk /ha , j, k = 1, 2..., 11. mj and dk are public information.
I still assume managers have the same expected ability, which is normalized to 0. However,
k
uncertainty about their ability, ha , or risk aversion degree, ρk , may be dierent, which
One way to observe this is by considering a matching model for a market with

captures the fact that managers are dierent in tenure or experience. Moreover, I assume

{mj }

1 and 2 with a common dierence of 0.1, while dk
is an arithmetic sequence between 2 and 2.4 with a common dierence of 0.04. Each rm is
matched with one manager. A matching pair of rm j and manager k , (mj , dk ), generates
∗
a net prot Πj,k = πs (mj , dk ), which is the rms revenue subtract the shareholder's cost of
is an arithmetic sequence between

innovation and the manager's cost of eort and risk. In the main setting with the assumption
of one rm and identical managers, the shareholders grab all the net prot and the manager's
participation constraint is binding. In the current case, there are heterogeneous managers
and rms, and shareholders are competing in hiring experienced managers.

As a result,

managers may earn a premium due to the competition and shareholders can only get part

Πj,k . Denote xj,k ∈ {0, 1} as the result of matching: xj,k = 1 if rm j hires
manager k , and xj,k = 0 otherwise. By the assignment game in Shapley and Shubik (1972),
∗
I can derive the equilibrium matchings {xj,k } by solving the following linear programming
of the net prot

problem:

M ax
{xj,k }

11 P
11
P

Πj,k · xj,k ,

k=1j=1

s.t.
11
P

xj,k ≤

1;

j=1
11
P

xj,k ≤

1;

j=1

xj,k ≥ 0.
It is a standard result (as shown in Roth and Sotomayour, 1990) that there exists a
solution

{x∗j,k } to the above linear programming problem with x∗j,k = 0 or 1.

The equilibrium

matching pattern is depicted in the following gure, where the X-axis is the shareholders'
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Figure 3: The equilibrium matching pattern.

mj , and the Y-axis is the manager's degree of career concerns, dk . The
dot with coordinate (mj , dk ) means the shareholders with mj hires the manager dk in the
∗
equilibrium matching pattern, namely xj,k = 1.

innovation urgency,

It can be seen from Figure 3 that in the equilibrium matching pattern, the managers with
the least career concerns are hired by rms with intermediate levels of innovation urgency.
The intuition is that the equilibrium matching pattern maximizes the sum of prots from all
pairs of rms and managers. Because managers with lower degrees of career concern generate
higher prots, they are hired by shareholders who value them most. For the shareholders,
the value of a less career concerned manager is measured by the marginal benet of reducing
d πs∗ (m, hρ )
a
, which depends on the innovation urgency, m. It
the degree of career concern, −
d ρ/ha
ρ
∗
d πs (m, h )
a
can be veried that −
has an inverse U-shape relationship with respect to the level
d ρ/ha
of innovation urgency

m,

which is shown in Proposition 4.

Figure 4 shows a numerical

d πs∗
example of the relationship between −
and the level of innovation urgency, when
d ρ/ha
and

ρ/ha = 2.

c=2

One way to understand Figure 4 is to consider the extreme cases in which the

level of innovation urgency is excessively low or high. For rms with a level of innovation
urgency, the innovative investment is low, which barely exposes the manager's ability through
the accounting signal. As previously shown in the case

m=1

in Figure 2, as the degree

of career concern increases, the shareholders choose a higher level of information quality
to motivate higher eort and at the same time decreases the innovative investment.
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The

shareholders are worse o by innovation decline, yet can be compensated somehow through
the manager's higher eort. As a result, the shareholders' expected payo does not decrease
that much as the manager's degree of career concerns increases. In the opposite case, wherein
the level of innovation urgency is extremely high, as shown in the case

m=2

in Figure 2,

in which the degree of career concern increases, the shareholders focus more on innovation,
choosing a lower level of information quality to mitigate the manager's career risk.

The

incremental innovation prot osets the shareholders' innovation prot decline. As a result,
the shareholders' expected payo is not very sensitive to the manager's degree of career
concern.
Unlike the extreme cases, for intermediate values of

m,

there is a strong tension between

motivating the manager's eort and obtaining innovation prot.

As shown in the case of

m = 1.5 in Figure 2, when the manager's degree of career concern increases, the shareholders
are not able to rely on either method to mitigate the career risk, but have to decrease both the
information quality and the innovative investment. As a result, the shareholders incur losses
from both the lower eort and innovation prot. In this case, hiring a manager with less
career concerns largely improves the shareholders' expected payo. Proposition 4 presents
the above results.

The shareholders' marginal benet of reducing the degree of career concern
has an inverse U-shaped relationship with the expected level of innovation urgency:

Proposition 4.

πs∗
− ddρ/h
a
πs∗
− ddρ/h
increases with
a
√
√
( 2−1)(ρ/ha )2 +( 2+1)c
.
2ρ/ha

Proof.

m

if

m <

√
√
( 2−1)(ρ/ha )2 +( 2+1)c
, and decreases with
2ρ/ha

m

if

m >

See Appendix.

Proposition 4 together with Figure 3 provide various implications for empirical studies about the relationship between managers' characteristics regarding career concerns and
rms' innovation decisions. It shows that compared with their peers with intermediate levels
of innovation urgency, shareholders with extreme values of innovation urgency have payos
less sensitive to managers' career concerns. The reason is that shareholders will protect the
manager from career risk by either implementing relatively safe business practices (for shareholders with low levels of innovation urgency), or disclosing less information (for shareholders
with high levels of innovation urgency). However, for rms with intermediate levels of innovation urgency, stronger career concerns result in both lower innovation investment and
managerial productive eort. As a result, managers' career concerns are most detrimental to
shareholders. In other words, these shareholders are the ones that most favor an experienced
manager that has ability with less uncertainty and is less concerned about exposure in the
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Figure 4:
function of

The marginal benet of reducing the manager's degree of career concern as a

m.

labor market. My result predicts that experienced managers are hired by middle-of-the-road
innovation rms.

3.5 What if a regulator mandates a high level of information quality?
Throughout the paper, I assume that the shareholders are able to choose both the information
quality and the innovative investment. However, it would be interesting to examine the case
in which a regulator determines the information quality, and to study how shareholders
choose the innovative investment as a response. Due to the complexity of the model, the
shareholders' optimal level of innovative investment for a given level of information quality

i∗ (h)

cannot be solved in the closed-form. However, I nd that the shareholders will reduce

the innovative investment when a regulator enforces a level of information quality above the
shareholders' optimal level, which is summarized in Proposition 5.

An improvement in the information quality from the optimal level for∗ the
∂ πs (k1 ,c∗
1 ,h,i)
∂
∂i
<
shareholders would induce the shareholders to decrease innovative investment; i.e.,
∂h
∗
∗
0 for i = i and h = h .
Proposition 5.
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Proposition 5 echoes concerns by regulators and academics that the implementation of
SOX may induce a decline in rms' R&D investments.

SOX mandates internal control

disclosures and improves transparency by increasing disclosure requirements. There is plenty
of empirical evidence showing that rms' R&D investments declined dramatically since SOX
was enacted (Bargeron et.al., 2009; Cohen et.al., 2013).

This phenomenon is interpreted

as that SOX incurs an extra reporting cost to the rm for R&D practices, resulting in less
R&D investment.

For example, the Biotechnology Industry Organization sent a letter to

the SEC, commenting on SOX's Section 404 rules: Many emerging biotech companies are
directing precious resources away from core research and development of new therapies for
patients due to overly complex controls or unnecessary evaluation of controls (Lehn, 2008).
My results provide a possible explanation for this evidence regarding the manager's career
concerns. I expect that after the implementation of SOX, rms disclosure is more informative,
which helps the labor market form a more accurate perception about managerial ability. My
results imply that the mandated high information quality leads to a higher career risk for
the manager. To mitigate the manager's career risk, the shareholders consequently decrease
the innovative investment.

4

Conclusions

This study examines shareholders joint decisions on the information quality and innovative
investment in the presence of managers' career concerns. Innovation initiatives are instructed
by shareholders with the objective to transform the rm and increase its competitiveness.
However, this kind of investments expose the manager's ability conspicuously to the labor
market.

This exposure increases the manager's career risk, which must be compensated

through an explicit contract. In other words, innovation generates managerial career risk,
which is a cost to shareholders.
I identify two methods by which shareholders can mitigate managerial career risk: lowering reporting information quality and reducing innovative investment. Nevertheless, lowering
information quality makes motivating managerial operating eort more dicult. Therefore,
shareholders, face a tradeo between mitigating the manager career-risk and motivating
the managerial eort. The relative value of innovation and the managerial eort for shareholders is mainly contingent on the level of innovation urgency. I nd that the impact of
the manager's degree of career concerns on shareholders decisions on innovative investment,
information quality and explicit incentives is non-monotonically contingent on the level of
innovation urgency.
When the level of innovation urgency is high, shareholders focus more on innovation and
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reduce information quality to mitigate the manager's career risk. As a result, the information
quality declines dramatically when the manager degree of career concerns increases. A lower
information quality protects the manager in the labor market, and induces shareholders to
increase innovative investment. Therefore, the shareholders increase innovative investment
as the degree of career concern increases.
When the level of innovation urgency is low, as the manager's degree of career concern
increases, shareholders rely on reducing innovative investment to mitigate the manager's
career risk. As the innovative investment declines, the rm outcome becomes less volatile,
and that allows shareholders to choose a higher explicit incentive to motivate the manager's
operating eort.
For intermediate levels of innovation urgency, shareholders have to reduce both information quality and innovative investment in response to an increase in the manager's career
concerns, which leads to both lower innovation prot and lower productive eort. Therefore, rms with intermediate levels of innovation urgency favor experienced managers (i.e.
managers with lower career concerns) most.
This study contributes to the extant literature that examines the interaction between
managers' career concerns and shareholders' investment decisions regarding innovation. My
results indicate that the relationship between managers' career concerns and rms' investment and compensation decisions depend non-monotonically on the level of innovation urgency. When we examine the impact of career concerns on rms' decisions on investment,
managerial incentives and manager selection, we need to consider the rms' innovation urgency. Because the level of innovation urgency may also varies among industries, my results
shed light on cross-industry studies on the impact of career concerns on rms' aforementioned
decisions.

5

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1:

Proof.

w2 (y) follows standard procedures. We have:
y = i · (m + a) + e + , where a ∼ N [0, 1/ha ], and  ∼ N [0, 1/h].
Therefore, after observing y , the labor market's updated belief about a, w2 (y),
The deduction of

w2 (y) = E[a|y] =

is:

Cov(a, y)
· (y − E[y]).
V ar[y]

Cov(a, y) = i/ha and E[y] = i · m + ê, the above equation
i/ha
2
m − b · ê), where k2 = var
and vary ≡ V ar[y] = i /ha + 1/h.
y
Since
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yields

w2 (y)= k2 (y − i ·

It can be proved that

∂ k2
∂h

> 0,

and

∂ k2
∂ ha

< 0.

Proof of Lemma 2:

Proof.

From Eq (6),

CR =

ρ i2 /ha
. Substituting
2ha vary

vary = i2 /ha + 1/h

into

CR ,

it can be

derived that:

∂ Cr
∂h
∂ Cr
∂i

=
=

i2 ρ
> 0;
2(ha +h·i2 )2
h·i·ρ
> 0.
(ha +h·i2 )2

Proof of Proposition 1:

Proof.

In the model, the shareholders make decisions on the

i, h,

and

w1

simultaneously.

However, for the sake of illustration, I rst calculate the shareholders' optimal linear contract

i

taking information
tion quality given

i

and

h

as given. Then, I solve for the shareholders' optimal informa-

and the shareholders' optimal linear contract.

Finally, I solve for the

shareholders optimal investment decision. According to the envelope theorem, the result I
derive from solving the three choice variables sequentially will be the same as solving them
simultaneously.
First, I solve for the shareholders optimal linear contract taking
Substituting the manager's optimal eort

e∗ = k1 + k2

h and i as given: w1∗ (i, h).

into the manager's expected utility

function Eq (2) yields:

ρ
1
ρ
U (w1 , w2 , e) = k1 (i · m + k1 + k2 ) + c1 − k12 vary − (k1 + k2 )2 − k22 vary .
2
2
2
In the equilibrium, the manager's IR constraint should be binding, namely U (w1 , w2 , e) =
a
0. It can be easily veried that vary = i/h
. As a result, c1 can be derived as:
k2
c∗1 (k1 , i, h) =
Substituting

c1 = c∗1 (k1 , i, h)

k22 − k12 + (k22 + k12 )ρ · vary
− k1 · i · m.
2
into shareholder's objective function as shown in Eq (5),

k1 , it can be derived:
1−k2
h) = 1+ρvary .
∗
Consequently, c1 (i, h) can be calculated as:
k2 −k∗2 +(k22 +k1∗2 )ρ·vary
c∗1 (i, h) = c∗1 (k1∗ (i, h), i, h) = 2 1
− k1∗ · i · m.
2

and from the rst order condition w.r.t

k1∗ (i,

The shareholders' optimal linear contract taking

w1∗ (i,

h) =

k1∗ (i,

h) · y +

c∗1 (i,

i

and

h

as given is:

h).

Next, I solve for the shareholders optimal information quality given
After substituting

e = k1 + k2 , k2 =

i/ha
and
vary

w1∗ (i, h)

sharheolders' objective function can be expressed as:
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w1∗ (i, h) and i: h∗ (i).

derived above into Eq (5), the

πs (h, i) = i · m +

i
/vary )
1 + ρ · i/ha · (2 − ha
ρ i2 /ha c 2
−
− i.
2(1 + ρ · vary )
2ha vary
2

(12)

h for a given level of i, h∗ (i), it is instructive to solve for the
2
optimal volatility of the signal, vary , for the shareholders rst. Becausevary = i /ha + 1/h
2
and h > 0, vary should be no less than i /ha . I focus on the interior solution which is
sustainable under Condition 1. From the rst order condition of πs (h, i) w.r.t vary , with
In order to derive the optimal

Condition 1, it can be derived:
√
√
a +(2+ 2)ρ]
vary∗ (i) = i[h22h
2 2 .
a +2iρha −i ρ
The optimal information quality

∗

h (i) =

h∗ (i)

can be calculated as:

1
.
vary∗ (i)−i2 /ha

Now, I calculate the shareholders optimal
and

w1 = w1∗ (i, h)

i

in the equilibrium. Substituting

h = h∗ (i)

into Eq (5), the sharheolder's objective function can be expressed as

√
√
h2a − 2( 2 − 1)ha iρ + (3 − 2 2)i2 ρ2 c 2
πs (i) = i · m +
− i.
2h2a
2
The rst order condition w.r.t. i yields:
√
2
2−1)ρha
√
.
i∗ = hha 2m−(
a c−(3−2 2)ρ
√
h2 m−( 2−1)ρha
∗
∗
√
Substituting i = a 2
into h (i), and
ha c−(3−2 2)ρ

w1∗ (i, h), Proposition 1 will be derived.

Proof of Corollary 1:

Proof.
∂i∗
∂m

It can be veried that under Condition 1,

∂h∗(i)
< 0.
∂i
∗
∗
∂h
Therefore, I can derive that
= ∂h∂i∗(i)
∂m

=

√1
c−(3−2 2)(ρ/ha )2

>0

and

·

∂i∗
∂m

< 0.

Proof of Corollary 2:

Proof.

It can be easily veried that

i∗ =

√
h2a m−( 2−1)ρha
√
2
ha c−(3−2 2)ρ

< i0 = m/c

for any

ρ/ha > 0.

Proof of Proposition 2:

Proof.

d i∗
d hρ

a

√
= (5 2 − 7) ·

√
√
−(ρ/ha )2 +2(1+ 2)m·ρ/ha −(3+2 2)c
√
[c−(3−2 2)(ρ/ha )2 ]2

Therefore, it can be derived that:
√
√
( 2−1)(ρ/ha )2 +( 2+1)c
d i∗
d i∗
, and
ρ < 0 if m <
dh
2ρ/ha
d hρ
a

a

Proof of Proposition 3:
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>0

if

m>

√
√
( 2−1)(ρ/ha )2 +( 2+1)c
.
2ρ/ha

√
h2 m−( 2−1)ρha
∗
∗
√
Substituting i = a 2
into k1 as shown in Eq (10), we can rewrite
ha c−(3−2 2)ρ
√
√
2)·c−(3 2−4)m·ρ/ha ]
√
.
k1∗ = (2−2[c−(3−2
2)(ρ/ha )2 ]
√
√
√
∗
d k1
2(10−7 2)c·ρ/ha −m[(17 2−24)(ρ/ha )2 +(3 2−4)c]
√
As a result, we have
.
ρ =
dh
2[c−(3−2 2)(ρ/ha )2 ]2
a

Proof.

Therefore, we can derive:
√
d k1∗
d k1∗
(6−4 2)cρ/ha
√
√
, and
ρ < 0 if m >
ρ
2
dh
d
(5 2−7)(ρ/ha ) +( 2−1)c
ha
a

>0

if

m<

k1∗

as:

√
(6−4 2)cρ/ha
√
.
(5 2−7)(ρ/ha )2 +( 2−1)c
√

Proof of Proposition 4:

Proof.

Substituting

i∗ =

√
h2a m−( 2−1)ρha
√
,
2
ha c−(3−2 2)ρ

h∗

and

w1∗

derived in Proposition 1 into the share-

holders' payo function as shown in Eq (5), the shareholders' equilibrium expected payo
can be calculated as:

πs∗ (m,

ρ
)
ha

√
c+m[m−2( 2−1)ρ/ha ]
√
.
2[c−(3−2 2)(ρ/ha )2 ]

=

As a result, we have:
√
√
√
d2 πs∗ (m, hρ )
−(5 2−7)(ρ/ha )2 +(6−4 2)m·ρ/ha −( 2−1)c
a
√
=
.
ρ
dmdh
[c−(3−2 2)(ρ/ha )2 ]2
a
Therefore, we can derive:
√
√
2
d2 π ∗ (m, ρ )
a ) +( 2+1)c
;
− d sm d ρha > 0 if m < ( 2−1)(ρ/h
2ρ/ha
ha
√
√
ρ
2
∗
2
)
d π (m,
a ) +( 2+1)c
.
− d sm d ρha < 0 if m > ( 2−1)(ρ/h
2ρ/h
a
h
a

Proof of Proposition 5:

Proof.

w1 as the optimal contract given i and h, w1∗ (h, i), we have
∗
∗
the shareholders' expected payo function as πs (k1 , c1 , h, i).
∗
For a given level of h, the optimal investment for the shareholder, i (h) should satisfy
Taking the linear contract

the rst order condition that:

∂ πs (k1∗ , c∗1 , h, i)
∂i

= 0 for i = i∗ (h).
of h on the above

The impact
∗ ,c∗ ,h,i)
∂ πs (k1
1
∂i

∂

=

∂h

rst order condition is:

∂ 2 πs (k1∗ ,c∗1 ,h,i)
.
∂ i∂ h

i = i∗ and h = h∗ = h∗ (i∗ ). h∗ (i) is shown in Proposition 1.
∂ πs (k1∗ ,c∗1 ,h,i)
Proposition 1, we have
= 0 if h = h∗ (i) for any i. It
∂h

In the equilibrium, we have
As shown in the proof of
can be veried that

∂ h∗ (i)
∂i

∗ ,c∗ ,h,i)
∂ 2 πs (k1
1

= − ∂ 2 πs∂(ki∗∂,ch∗ ,h,i) ,
1 1
∂ h2

where

h = h∗ (i).

The denominator of the above equation,
if

∗

h = h (i),

we have

∂2

πs (k1∗ ,c∗1 ,h,i)
∂ i∂ h

∝

∂

h∗ (i)
∂i

i=i

and

∗

h=h

h = h∗ (i).

Therefore,

.

As derived in the proof of Corollary 1,

∗

∂ 2 πs (k1∗ ,c∗1 ,h,i)
is negative for
∂ h2
∂ h∗ (i)
∂i

.

29

< 0.

As a result,

∂ 2 πs (k1∗ ,c∗1 ,h,i)
∂ i∂ h

< 0

for
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